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ARGUMENT 
Issue No. 1 
The Court Should Apply the Correction of Error 
Standard of Review. 
Defendant Energy Mutual Insurance Company asserts that 
the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and the Industrial Commission 
found a lack of medical causation between Ms. Cox's industrial 
injuries and her permanent total disability. Based upon this 
assertion, Energy Mutual concludes that the "substantial evidence" 
standard of review should be applied by this court. (Defendant's 
Brief at 3). Energy Mutual relies upon such a finding of lack of 
medical causation in asserting that Ms. Cox is not entitled to 
benefits under the "odd-lot" doctrine. 
Defendant is incorrect. Both the ALJ's Findings of Fact 
Conclusions of Law and Order and the Industrial Commission's Order 
Denying Motion for Review contain findings of at least minimal 
medical causation between Ms. Cox's industrial accidents and her 
permanent total disability. The ALJ accepted the medical panel 
report containing findings of medical causation as her own, and the 
parties have not challenged those findings. Therefore, the issue 
is whether the ALJ and Industrial Commission correctly applied its 
findings to the applicable law. The standard of review in such 
circumstances is the correction of error standard of review without 
deference to the decision of the administrative agency. 
2 
On November 3, 1992, Ms. Cox was referred to a medical 
panel for evaluation, which issued its report on November 27, 1992. 
The ALJ adopted the medical panel report to resolve all issues of 
causation and impairment. (R. 80). The medical panel found Ms. 
Cox to be suffering from a 36% whole person permanent impairment. 
(R. 78). Of Ms. Cox's 36% whole person impairment, 2.83% was 
attributed to the industrial injury she suffered on August 15, 
1988. Id. An additional 1.27% was attributed to the industrial 
injury she suffered in December, 1987. Id. The remaining 
percentage of Ms. Cox's whole person impairment stems from her 
preexisting condition. Id. Nothing has contributed to Ms. Cox's 
whole person impairment rating since the industrial accident on 
August 15, 1988. Id. On December 21, 1992, Ms. Cox was declared 
by Social Security to be disabled. (R. 51-57, 65). The ALJ found 
that Ms. Cox is "probably totally disabled." (R. 85). 
Petitioner is mindful of the distinction between an 
applicant's disability and impairment. However, it defies logic to 
recognize that on the one hand, industrial accidents have medically 
contributed to a person's overall impairment rating and that the 
impairment has caused permanent total disability, but on the other 
hand, to then assert that the industrial accidents did not 
contribute to the permanent total disability. 
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The conclusion that the impairments stemming from the 
industrial accidents medically contributed to Ms. Cox's overall 
disability is supported by the comments of both the ALJ and the 
Industrial Commission. For example, the ALJ found that the August 
15, 1988 injury contributed to the applicant's overall disability, 
albeit "only minimally." (R. at 82). Likewise the ALJ found that 
"some of the applicant's medical care providers have pointed to the 
applicant's back and neck problems and her loss of her job as 
causes of her current disability." (R. 80). The ALJ discounted 
that finding, however, because the industrial injuries were not 
"the sole cause of her back and neck problems and the loss of her 
job." Id. (emphasis added). 
Likewise the Industrial Commission recognized that there 
was a causal relationship between the industrial accidents and Ms. 
Cox's overall whole person impairment, and between her whole person 
impairment and the disability: 
The medical panel assigned 95% of the 
applicant's 14% lower impairment and 80% of 
the applicant's 17% cervical spine impairment 
to the applicant's balloon chasing accident 
and other pre-existing impairments. The 
relatively small proportion of the applicant's 
impairment that was attributed to the 
industrial accident of August 15, 1988, is, in 
our view, insufficient to support a finding 
that the applicant's permanent total 
4 
disability was caused by that industrial 
accident. 
(R. 122).x 
While both the ALJ and the Industrial Commission found 
medical causation between the industrial accidents and the 
impairments that led to permanent total disability, both applied 
either a significant cause legal standard or an exclusive cause 
legal standard, neither of which is the correct legal standard to 
apply. The application of erroneous legal standards led to the 
denial of benefits. 
Hence the standard of review by this court should be the 
correction of error without deference to the decision of the 
administrative agency, as this case hinges on the application of 
facts to law or interpretation of law. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
16(4); Willardson v. Industrial Commission, 216 U.A.R. 12 (Utah 
App. June 28, 1993). King v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 850 P.2d 
1281, 1286 (Utah App. 1993); Luckau v. Industrial Commission, 840 
P.2d 811 (Utah App. 1992); Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing 
Division, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
1
 Even the defendant apparently concedes medical causation 
when it points out that there "are medical opinions that said 
accident contributed to Applicant's overall disability." (R. 106) . 
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Issue No. 2 
The Correct Standard for Medical Causation is the 
Medically Demonstrable Causal Link Standard 
As discussed above and in Ms. Cox's original brief, the 
ALJ and Industrial Commission applied "significant cause" or 
"exclusive cause" standards of medical causation. The application 
of those standards was prejudicial error. Most recently this court 
opined in Abel v. Industrial Commission, 221 Utah Adv. 15 (Utah 
App. Sept. 3f 1993), "By focusing on the significant cause of 
Abel's disability ... the Board applied an incorrect standard, and 
such ruling cannot stand." Id. 
The Abel case is remarkably similar to the present case. 
Like Ms. Cox, the applicant suffered an industrial back injury. 
The applicant also suffered from many other significant ailments 
which contributed much more heavily to the disability than the 
minimal impairments attributable to the industrial accident. 
Similar to Ms. Cox, the impairment attributable to the industrial 
accident only accounted for five percent of the applicant's whole 
person impairment. Id. Based upon these facts, the ALJ concluded 
that the industrial accident did not medically cause the permanent 
total disability. Id. The Industrial Commission affirmed the 
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ALJ's finding, stating that the "industrial accident was not a 
significant cause of his permanent disability." Id. at 16.2 
The court reversed the Industrial Commission, stating 
that the appropriate standard for finding medical causation is not 
a significant cause standard. Id. The court was explicit in 
holding that Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1988) does not require the 
ALJ or the Industrial Commission to find the industrial injury to 
be a significant cause of the disability. In pre-1990 claims for 
industrial accidents, it is reversible error for the ALJ or 
Industrial Commission to impose a quantitative element in the 
causation analysis. Id. The courts holding is consistent with 
and reaffirms the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Allen v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), where the court held 
that the applicant must only show "a medically demonstrable causal 
link between the work-related exertions and the unexpected injuries 
that resulted from those strains." Id. (emphasis added). 
2
 The Industrial Commission based its decision upon Utah 
Admin. Code R490-1-17(C) (1991) which adds a quantitative 
requirement of a "significant cause of the disability." This rule 
was promulgated in 1990 while the applicant's industrial injury 
occurred in 1989, hence the court held that it had no application 
to his claim. Id. The court's holding clearly demonstrates that 
the rule, or its substantive implications, can have no retroactive 
application to this case. Ms. Cox suffered her industrial 
accidents in December 1987, and on August 15, 1988. (R. 69-70). 
Therefore Ms. Cox need not show any quantitative causation. 
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Though the impairments caused by Ms. Cox's industrial 
accidents constitute only a small portion of Ms. Cox's overall 
impairment, and Ms. Cox's whole person impairment is one of many 
factors contributing to her disability, there is a medically 
demonstrable link between the industrial accidents and her 
disability. Application of the correct causation standards as 
found in Allen and Abel dictate that Ms. Cox should receive 
benefits for her permanent total disability. 
Issue No. 3 
The Applicant is Entitled to Permanent and Total Disability 
Under the "Odd-Lot" Doctrine. 
Permanent total disability benefits should be granted 
"[w]hen a relatively small percentage of impairment caused by an 
industrial accident is combined with other factors to render the 
claimant unable to obtain employment." Zimmerman v. Industrial 
Comm'n of Utah, 785 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah App. 1989) (emphasis 
added). Because Ms. Cox has demonstrated medical causation, she is 
entitled to benefits under the odd-lot doctrine. Zupon v. 
Industrial Commission, 221 U.A.R. 37, 38 (Utah App., September 14, 
1993) . 
Likewise, plaintiff has demonstrated that she cannot be 
rehabilitated. The evidence is uncontroverted that Delvin 
McFarlane, LCSW, upon evaluating Ms. Cox, determined on March 30, 
1992 that there was no way that Ms. Cox could return to work and 
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that she should receive a speedy disability retirement. (R. 76). 
A functional capacity evaluation of Ms. Cox at Carbon Emery 
Physical Therapy/Alta Health Services determined that she could 
only participate in light/sedentary work. Id. Ms. Cox has met the 
burden of showing that she cannot be rehabilitated. The burden was 
upon defendant to demonstrate otherwise. Zupon, 221 UAR 37, 38. 
It has not met this burden, thus benefits should be awarded. 
It is disingenuous for defendant to argue that benefits 
are not warranted due to the failure to refer to the Division of 
Vocational Rehabilitation. First, it was the ALJ's erroneous 
application of the wrong legal standard that precluded a tentative 
finding of permanent total disability which would have triggered 
such a referral. Applicant cannot be denied relief because of the 
very error from which she has appealed. 
Second, a referral to the Division would be a meaningless 
act which the law does not demand. It is clear that Ms. Cox cannot 
return to her former employment. The ALJ conceded that Ms. Cox was 
"probably totally disabled." The Social Security Administration, 
applying standards very much like those governing permanent total 
disability in the Industrial Commission, has found her to be 
totally disabled. Nothing stands to be gained by making a futile 
referral to the Vocational Rehabilitation Division, where 
vocational counselors have already determined Ms. Cox to be 
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disabled and essentially unemployable. The burden now rests upon 
defendant to show that the applicant is not totally disabled, which 
burden defendant cannot meet. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts as found by the ALJ and affirmed by the 
Industrial Commission establish a medically demonstrable link 
between Claudia Cox's industrial injuries and her permanent, total 
disability. However, neither the ALJ nor the Industrial Commission 
correctly applied the proper causation standard of "a medically 
demonstrable causal link." 
Application of the correct standard demonstrates that Ms. 
Cox qualifies for permanent total disability under the "odd-lot" 
doctrine." The industrially related impairment, coupled with non-
industrial factors, have rendered Ms. Cox disabled and entitled to 
benefits. 
This Court is charged with correction of errors committed 
by the Industrial Commission. The undisputed facts of this case 
justify a reversal of the Industrial Commission's order denying 
Cox's Motion for Review. This Court should remand to the 
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Industrial Commission with directions to enter an award of 
permanent total disability benefits to Claudia Cox. 
DATED this /Otk day of December, 1993, 
EDWARD B. H A V A S 7 
Attorney for Applicant/Petitioner 
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ADDENDUM 
Determinative Statutes 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 35-1-67 
35-1-67. Permanent total disability — Amount of pay-
ments. 
(1) In cases of permanent total disability caused by an industrial accident, 
the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this section. Perma-
nent total disability for purposes of this chapter requires a finding by the 
commission of total disability, as measured by the substance of the sequential 
decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under Title 20 
of the Code of Federal Regulations as revised. The commission shall adopt 
rules that conform to the substance of the sequential decision-making process 
of the Social Security Administration under 20 C.F.R. Subsections 404.1520 
(b), (c), (d), (e), and (0 (1) and (2), as revised. 
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312-
week entitlement, compensation shall be 662/3% of the employee's average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury, limited as follows: 
(a) Compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury. 
(b) Compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per 
week, plus S5 for a dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child 
under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor 
children, but not exceeding the maximum established in Subsection (a) 
nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the 
injury. 
(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation 
rate under Subsection (b) shall be 36% of the current state average 
weekly wage, rounded to the nearest dollar. 
(3) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks 
of permanent total disability compensation except as outlined in Section 
35-1-69. The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay 
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in 
this section and Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-65.1, and 35-1-66, in excess of the 
amount of compensation payable over 312 weeks at the applicable permanent 
total disability compensation rate under Subsection (2). Any overpayment of 
this compensation shall be reimbursed to the employer or its insurance carrier 
by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid out of the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee. 
(4) After an employee has received compensation from his employer, its 
insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of 
disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable perma-
nent total disability compensation rate, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
shall pay all remaining permanent total disability compensation. Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer 
°r its insurance carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or Sec-
tion 35-1-69. Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection 
(2), the compensation payable by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall be 
reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50% of the 
Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the same 
Period. 
(5) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall ' - all 
c
^ses be tentative and not final until all of the following proceedings iave 
occurred: 
209 
35-1-67 LABOR - INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
(a) Upon tentatively determining that an employee is permanently and 
totally disabled, the commission shall, unless otherwise agreed by the 
parties, refer the employee to the vocational rehabilitation agency under 
the State Board of Education for rehabilitation training. The commission 
shall order that an amount be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), for use in the rehabilitation 
and training of the employee. 
lb) If the vocational rehabilitation agency under the State Board of 
Education certifies to the commission in writing that the employee has 
fully cooperated with that agency in its efforts to rehabilitate the em-
ployee, and in the opinion of the agency, the employee is not able to be 
rehabilitated, the commission shall, after notice to the parties, hold a 
hearing to consider the agency's opinion as well as other evidence regard-
ing rehabilitation. The parties may waive the right to a hearing. If a 
preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not 
possible, the commission shall order that the employee be paid weekly 
permanent total disability compensation benefits. The period of benefits 
commences on the date the employee became permanently totally dis-
abled, as determined by the commission based on the facts and evidence, 
and ends with the death of the employee or when the employee is capable 
of returning to regular, steady work. In any case where an employee has 
been rehabilitated or the employee's rehabilitation is possible, but where 
the employee has some loss of bodily function, the award shall be for 
permanent partial disability. An employee is not entitled to compensa-
tion, unless the employee fully cooperates with any rehabilitation effort 
under this section. 
(6) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both 
arms, both feet, both legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such body 
members, constitutes total and permanent disability, to be compensated ac-
cording to this section. No tentative finding of permanent total disability is 
required in any such instance. 
History: C. 1953, 35-1-67, enacted by L. ment substituted "$120" for "$110" in the first 
1988, ch. 116, § 4. sentence of the second paragraph. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1988, Effective Dates. — Section 2 of Laws 1985, 
ch. 116, § 4 repeals former § 35-1-67, as last ch. 160 provided: "This act takes effect upon 
amended by Laws 1985, ch. 160, § 1, relating approval by the governor, or the day following 
to permanent total disability, effective July 1, the constitutional time limit of Article VII, 
1988, and enacts the present section. ^ » ™ * o u t t h e *?ve™T s f^^f^L* 
Amendment Notes. - The 1985 amend- ^ c a s e / M a veKtol ftth%dAte o f V e t° o v e m d e -
Approved March 18, 198o. 
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R490-1-17. Permanent Total Disability 
• • • • 
C. In evaluating industrial claims in whicl: 
the injured worker has qualified for Social 
Security disability benefits, the Commission 
will determine if a significant cause of the 
disability is the claimant's industrial accident 
or some other unrelated cause or causes. 
Utah Admin. Code R490-1-17(C) (199 
(emphasis added). 
